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Where Two Legal Systems Collide: An American Constitutional
Scholar in Hong Kong
Michael C. Davis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration ("Joint Declaration"), Hong Kong, a significantly Westernized community with a
highly developed economy, will become a Special Administrative Region
("SAR") of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") on July 1, 1997. As
a SAR it will be fundamentally constituted under a Basic Law that is
now being drafted. Inevitably, elements of the Chinese legal system and
the British common law legal system will act in concert to determine the
characteristics of the end product, the Basic Law. Where two legal systems collide, major research implications for comparative legal scholarship are present. This Article aims to furnish a basis for considering
those implications.
In drafting the Basic Law, the Chinese government is employing a
very elaborate system embodying both a Basic Law Drafting Committee
and a Basic Law Consultative Committee. This process is designed to
ensure consultation with a large cross section of the Hong Kong community and the drafting of a constitution suitable to their needs and the
aspirations of the Joint Declaration. The Drafting Committee includes
significant representation from both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong
compatriots, while the Consultative Committee is made up of only Hong
Kong compatriots. Both the drafting and consultative committees have
also established select working groups to tackle various topic areas of the
Basic Law. 1
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law; L.L.M., Yale Law School; Lecturer
in Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. An earlier version of this Article was presented to
the panel on international legal exchange, The Idea of the Constitution, at the 1987 Annual Meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools, January 1987. The author wishes to thank The Centre
for Contemporary Asian Studies of The Chinese University of Hong Kong for funding the research
and Dr. King W. Chow for his helpful comments on the earlier draft of this Article.
I The Basic Law Drafting Committee has six subgroups: 1) economic system, 2) rights and
duties of Hong Kong inhabitants, 3) culture, technology, education and religion, 4) political structure of the Special Administrative Region (SAR), 5) relationship between the Central Government
and the SAR, and 6) law. The Consultative Committee for the Basic Law has eight subgroups: 1)
political structure of the SAR, 2) the structure of the Basic Law, 3) law, 4) inhabitants' and other
persons' rights, freedom, welfare, and duties, 5) finance, business, and economy, 6) culture, technol-
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One can imagine that in countries with established constitutional
systems, there is an interest in American constitutional law merely for
the sake of developing general knowledge of a comparative nature. In
the Basic Law drafting frenzy that permeates modem Hong Kong, an
American comparative constitutional scholar encounters a thirst for foreign constitutional ideas with the potential for immediate application.
This thirst, however, does not seek to be quenched by adoption of an
unmolested foreign concept. The mainland Chinese and Hong Kong
participants have shown a willingness to develop unique approaches, as
reflected in the notion of "one country, two systems." An American
comparative constitutional scholar in Hong Kong would be remiss if he
or she did not contribute to this important public discussion.
In considering the "idea of the constitution" an American constitutional scholar in Hong Kong encounters a seemingly endless array of
claims seeking resolution. While many of these claims draw primarily
upon Hong Kong's unique political history and circumstances, several
fundamental issues invite comparison with the American constitutional
experience. Within the context of this panel on international legal exchange and the American Constitution, this Article will introduce several of these issues, with an eye to noting the potential value of
comparative constitutional analysis to the Hong Kong Basic Law drafting enterprise.
In noting this potential value of comparative constitutional scholarship, it is imperative to advocate a readjustment of the mission of comparative legal scholarship. Such scholarship has too often been involved
merely in descriptive studies of foreign legal systems. In a world where
the mission of constitutionalism is ever-expanding, a more truly comparative form of constitutional scholarship is needed. This pressing need is
particularly obvious in the rapidly changing world of Asian constitutionalism: scholars inevitably discover that a more application oriented form
of comparative constitutional scholarship-one that aims better at a
moving target-is needed. By way of illustration, advocating such a mission is an underlying primary point of this Article.
As Hong Kong sets about implementing a written constitution, the
value of comparison with the oldest written constitutional tradition is
apparent. This Article cannot fully carry out the invited comparison in
the several areas noted; however, it extends that invitation to American
constitutional scholars anticipating international legal exchange or some
other form of participation in Basic Law drafting in Hong Kong or elseogy, education, and religion, 7) external affairs, and 8) the relationship between the Central Government and the SAR. See Annual Report of the Consultative Committeefor the Basic Law, 1986, S.
China Morning Post, Feb. 23, 1987. Note that only twenty-three members of the fifty-eight member
Drafting Committee are from Hong Kong. See Finalpieces of the Jigsaw, S. China Morning Post,
Aug. 22, 1987.
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where. Opportunities for application oriented comparative scholarship
are abundant. In addition to noting the key issues, I will briefly chart the
course which I took in a previous Article with respect to one of these
issues.2 This is done merely to illustrate some relevant factors in application oriented comparative legal scholarship. A theoretical framework for
such scholarship is certainly in need of further development.'
II. THE

BASIC LAW DEBATE

Several key issues have emerged as the most contentious and critical
to the success of the "one country, two systems" endeavor. While the
Chinese drafters have a seemingly monolithic view on these issues,
widely varied views have emerged among the Hong Kong participants.
While this debate may give greater weight to politics than it does to theory, one does sense a sincere concern about Hong Kong's continued stability among drafters on both sides of these issues. Many of these issues
are perceived as very relevant to the existence of true autonomy for the
future SAR. These issues are ripe for application oriented comparative
analysis. A brief discussion of these issues is provided to aid in identification of their salient features.
4.

Selection of the Future SAR Governor

Among the most contentious issues to emerge in the current Basic
Law drafting debate has been the method for selection of the future governor. Of the several models proposed, the competing models of two well
organized groups associated with the drafting process have emerged as
the main contenders. The "Group of 76," which is generally characterized as conservative and pro-business, would have the future governor
elected by an electoral college of 600 members.4 A twenty-member nominating committee would select three candidates. Members of the electo2

Davis, A Common Law Court in a Marxist Country, The Case For ConstitutionalJudicial

DEN. J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y - (Spring 1988) (forthcoming).
It has been suggested that some of these contentious issues, especially the first two, may
not be resolved in the first draft of the Basic Law in early 1988 which may only list options. Drafters
Split on CrucialIssues, S. China Morning Post, Aug. 28, 1987.
4 See Collection of Draft Provisions of the Various Chapters Prepared By the Subgroups of the
Drafting Committee [hereinafter "Basic Law Draft"], art. 45 (Collection of Documents of the Sixth
Plenary Session of the Drafting Committee, Compiled by the Secretariat of the Drafting Committee
of the Basic Law (Dec. 1987)). This article is still worded in the alternative and could well remain so
in the final draft to be produced by the seventh plenary session in May 1988. This draft will be
referred to herein. No major changes are expected in the final draft to be submitted for community
consultation in May of 1988. See also Splits Appear in Law Group, S. China Morning Post, Sept. 8,
1986; Electoral College Plan Is Favoredby Committee, S. China Morning Post, Sept. 14, 1986 [hereinafter Electoral College Plan];New Formulato Elect ChiefExecutive, S. China Morning Post, Nov.
5, 1986; Chief Executive Options, S. China Morning Post, July 3, 1987. The "Group of 71" was
originally the "Group of 57" and recently the "Group of 76". See Group of 76 To Give Poll a Miss,

Review in The Hong Kong SAR, 16
3 I.
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ral college would be elected from eleven functional constituencies
representing various industry, labor, and government sectors of the community. The liberal model proposed by the "Group of 190," which is
made up of more liberal, democracy oriented drafters and community
leaders, would have the governor candidate nominated by no less than
10% of the legislature and then directly elected on a one man, one vote
basis.' The electoral college proposal of the "Group of 76" is generally
perceived as more conservative and more subject to control from Beijing.
This proposal is thought to be in line with Beijing's own view.6 The more
liberal model incorporating universal sufferage is thought by its supporters to be better equipped to insure greater autonomy and confidence in
Hong Kong.
Since the Joint Declaration merely provides for the chief executive
to be selected by election or through local consultations and then appointed by the Central People's Government, 7 it does not resolve this
conflict. The conflict must therefore be resolved by the Basic Law
drafters.
The terse statement in the Joint Declaration raises another issue in
the selection process concerning whether or not Beijing can refuse a candidate selected locally. It appears to be Beijing's view that it need not
endorse the locally selected candidate. The political sub-group of the
Drafting Committee has apparently endorsed the view that Beijing's appointment should not be nominal. China, however, would "fully consider the aspirations" of Hong Kong people and not interfere with the
nomination process held locally.8 The amount of power given in the Basic Law to the chief executive will no doubt have some bearing on Beijing's behavior in this respect. Beijing appears to favor a powerful chief
executive similar to the current colonial governor. There is agreement in
other respects, namely that the chief executive must be over forty years
old, must be a Chinese national and must have lived in Hong Kong conS.China

Morning Post, Aug. 12, 1987. They have also been called the business and professional
group but for convenience will be referred to as the "Group of 76" in this Article.
5 The Group of 190: Fightingfor Change, S.China Morning Post, Apr. 21, 1987.
6 While Beijing is careful not to directly favor one side or the other, the general conservativeness of pronouncements from mainland officials and conclusions reached by drafting subgroups
heavily weighted with mainland members is such as to suggest that Beijing would generally favor the
more conservative model. See ElectoralCollege Plan, supra note 4; Beling Keen to Exercise Control,
S.China Morning Post, Oct. 27, 1986.
7 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec.
19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352)
para. 3(4), [hereinafter Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1371 (within the British White
Paper referred to as the Draft Agreement).
8 Beifing To Have Final Say in Choice of Chief, S.China Morning Post, Aug. 27, 1986.
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tinuously for more than twenty years.9
Resolution of the contentious issues still awaits further discussion.
It would appear that some comparative and theoretical assessment could
be made of the potential for these models and various compromise models to achieve the desired stability and autonomy envisioned in the Joint
Declaration. In doing so, a comparative scholar might consider the
objectives of the participants, their political culture, and their conceptual
difficulties.
B.

Composition of the FutureLegislature

When it comes to the composition of the post-1997 legislature, the
differences in the final analysis appear smaller, while the amount of contention is larger. For a comparativist this area again is ripe for comparative legal and political analysis. Which model would ultimately render
the desired degree of political stability and autonomy? The Joint Declaration again provides very terse guidance, indicating that the SAR Legislature "shall be constituted by elections" and that the executive shall be
"accountable to the legislature." 10
On first glance the differences in the two main opposing models
seem to be largely an affair of numbers. For the "Group of 190" or the
"democratic group," the post-1997 legislature should be composed of
legislative councilors who are 50% directly elected from geographical
constituencies, 25% from functional constituencies and 25% elected by
local government district boards, the Urban Council, and the Regional
Council.1 1 The "Group of 76," now often referred to as the "Business
and Professional Group", advocates that eighty legislative councilors be
selected, 50% by functional constituencies, 25% by the electoral college
(the electoral college would have 600 members elected from functional
constituencies), and 25% by direct election. 2 The conservative group
seems to place a lot of confidence in functional constituencies which were
employed for the first time in the last election to the Legislative Council
in Hong Kong and which seem to openly acknowledge the role of traditional power elites in government. This conservative group and Beijing
have frequently expressed fear of instability should Hong Kong adopt the
Western democratic model. Beijing's views in this respect may well
hinge in part on the question of accountability: that is, Beijing may be
9 The Profile of the Chief Executive, S. China Morning Post, June 11, 1987.
10 Joint Declaration, supra note 7, Annex I, § I.
11 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 64; Working Towards a Democratic Government, S.
China Morning Post, Apr. 27, 1987.
12 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 64; New Formulato Elect Chief Executive, supra note 4.
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more amenable to a more democratic
legislature if that body has little
13
power to check the chief executive.
While the aforementioned legislative composition alignment seems
to be an affair of numbers with potential ease for compromise, the road to
democracy proves, in fact, to be strewn with many more obstacles. The
current debate over political reform in Hong Kong includes proposals
towards achieving a more representative government. The recently published Green Paper on representative government includes options for
incorporating direct elections to the Legislative Council." This has
raised strong opposition from conservative members of the "Group of
76" and from representatives of the Beijing government.1 5 It is generally
suggested that any such political reform should await promulgation of
the Basic Law so as to assure convergence. One mainland representative
went so far as to suggest that such development would violate the Joint
Declaration, but his statement was retracted the next day. 6 More liberal
public speakers have suggested that the natural development of more
representative government in response to popular demand would inform
the Basic Law drafting process and thus assure convergence.
In debates reminiscent of those of the drafters of the American Constitution, fears have been expressed from local conservatives and Beijing
that having too many directly elected legislators will render a legislative
body that will be politically strong enough to challenge the governor and
thus interfere with the smooth transfer of government.17 China is said to
want "talent in administrative management rather than politicians, so as
13 GradualReform Urged for 1997, S.China Morning Post, Nov. 10, 1986; Deng Criticizedfor
"Being Misinformed," S.China Morning Post, Apr. 18, 1987; FinalPieces of the Jigsaw, supra note
2; Students Question Power Proposal,S. China Morning Post, Aug. 24, 1987; Strong Opposition To a
More Powerful Legislature,S. China Morning Post, Aug. 26, 1987. This debate over a legislative-led
government versus an executive-led government has been characterized as being one between a British style versus American style, but this seems incorrect since legislative checks exist under the
American system. DelicateBalance In Allocation of Power, S.China Morning Post, Aug. 28, 1987.
This structural question could be added as an additional issue herein, but it is intimately connected
with issues A & B and, therefore, subsumed thereunder.
14 Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government, May 1987
(Hong Kong Government Publication). The subsequent White Paper delays any introduction of
direct election to the Legislative Council until 1991 when a small number (10) of directly elected
councilors will be permitted. WHITE PAPER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: THE WAY FORWARD (February 1988). The White Paper is currently under debate but it
appears the conservative view will win out.
Is Beijing Opposed to Early Elections, S.China Morning Post, Feb. 2, 1987. Best Election Date
1991-Lu, S.China Morning Post, Feb. 14, 1987; Direct Election Support Requires Legal Backup:
Xu, S.China Morning Post, May 2, 1987; We Don't Need Any PoliticalReform, Says Sir S.Y., S.
China Morning Post, May 4, 1987.
16 China and HK Headingfor Row, S.China Morning Post, June 19, 1987; New Uproaras Li
Hou Denies Remark, S. China Morning Post, June 24, 1987.
17 Beijing Opposed to Early Elections, supra note 15.
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to implement the policy of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' [gangren zhi gang] after 1997. " 18
Another concern often attributed to Beijing and openly expressed by
conservatives is that there be no development of political parties in Hong
Kong.1 9 It is felt that the introduction of political parties would overheat
politics and too easily result in challenges to Beijing rule. It is a twist of
irony in that by organizing themselves into a political "Group of 76" the
conservatives who generally oppose political parties may have created
the beginning of a political party. The rival "Group of 190" has indicated that it will field candidates for district board elections.2 0 The
"Group of 76" has indicated that it will not but that members of the
group "can run for any election as individuals."2 1 It appears that the
conservative "Group of 76" may be caught in its own political web.
C. Interpretingand Implementing the Basic Law
The third main issue remaining highly contentious relates to the
power of the judiciary to interpret the Basic Law. Justice Jackson once
stated: "If put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet
substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures
than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices."2 2 If the reference is changed from Soviet Russia to the PRC this
statement may have a rather serious bearing on the future prospects of
constitutionalism in the common law jurisdiction of Hong Kong. It is
too early to determine whether the future Basic Law, to be enacted by
China's National People's Congress ("NPC"), will be "applied in good
faith by our common-law procedures."23
In all the hullabaloo over the electoral process, political structure,
and other features of the Basic Law, there has been little attention given
to the process for implementing the Basic Law. Beginning in early 1987,
some Hong Kong members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee began
to come out rather strongly in favor of the Hong Kong courts retaining
the power to interpret the Basic Law. Nevertheless, a majority of the
members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee appear set to recommend
placing the primary power of review over Hong Kong SAR legislation in
the Standing Committee of the NPC.2 4 This power is said to be consis18 Id.
19 We Don't Need Any Political Reform, Says Sir S. Y., supra note 15; Group of 76 To Give Polla
Miss, supra note 4; Group Turns on the Election Pressure, S. China Morning Post, Aug. 21, 1987.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 Id.
24 The relevant draft article which appears slated for final approval in the Seventh Plenary
Session of the Basic Law Drafting Committee reads as follows:
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tent with the PRC Constitution which provides for the NPC Standing

Committee to interpret national legislation.25 After further discussion

and opportunity for community input during the consultation period,
Hong Kong participants may be able to get at least some part of what
they are asking for. This may, on refinement, embody some aspects of
what is in most common law jurisdictions referred to as constitutional
judicial review of legislation. With several months remaining in the
drafting process current attention to this issue is timely.
Constitutional judicial review, in its refined stage of development,
may be the most fundamental contribution of the United States to constitutionalism and human rights development. Nevertheless, Hong Kong
brings together two converging legal forces that have had little use of this
instrument for constitutional implementation. The Chinese employ what

is described as legislative implementation of their national constitution,
i.e., the constitution is interpreted by the NPC or its Standing Committee
and takes on life only when its principles are enacted into legislation. 6
There is no judicial review of legislative acts in China. Likewise, Hong
Kong being a beneficiary in part of the British tradition of parliamentary
supremacy, does not employ constitutional judicial review of legislation.
Hong Kong does have a British system of judicial review of administrative acts as well as some very confined and virtually unemployed means
for the judiciary to review legislation.27 Like their British counterparts,
Article 168: The power of interpretation of the Basic Law shall be vested in the NPC
Standing Committee.
If the NPC Standing Committee has given an interpretation of a provision of the Basic
Law, the courts of the HKSAR shall in applying such provision follow the interpretation
of the NPC Standing Committee. However, judgments previously given shall not be affected.
The courts in the HKSAR may, in adjudicating cases before them, interpret provisions of the Basic Law. If a case involves the interpretation of a provision of the Basic Law
concerning defence, foreign affairs and other affairs which are the responsibilities of the
Central Government, the courts of the HKSAR shall ask the NPC Standing Committee to
give an interpretation of the relevant provision before giving their final judgment on the
case.
The NPC Standing Committee shall consult the HKSAR Basic Law Committee
before giving an interpretation of this Law.
Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 168.
25 XIANFA (Constitution) art. 67(4) (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.].
26 P.R.C. CONST. See generally R. EDWARDS, L. HENKIN, & A. NATHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986) [hereinafter EDWARDS]; A. Chen, Xianggang Jibenfa de Jieshi
(The question on the Interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law), WIDE ANGLE MAGAZINE, Mar.
16, 1985, at 24-27.
27 In additional to review of administrative acts, Hong Kong law affords limited conceptual
possibilities for judicial review of legislative acts. See P. Wesley-Smith, Legal Limitations Upon the
Legislative Competence of the Hong Kong Legislature, I1 HONG KONG L.J. 3 (1981). Most noteworthy is a limited power of review for conformity to acts of the British Parliament. Rediffusion (H.K.)
Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., 1968 HKLR 277 (Sup. Ct.); Rediffusion (H.K.) Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., 1970
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the Hong Kong judiciary has had no written bill of rights to implement.
Hong Kong's written constitution is confined to Letters Patent and
Royal Instructions that merely delineate the structure of government and
governmental powers.
The advent of a written Basic Law with a substantial rights component will work a fundamental change in the style of constitutionalism in
Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration affords little guidance on this issue.
As briefly discussed for illustrative purposes in the next section of this
Article, however, this issue is one ripe for application of comparative
law.
D.

The Concept of Human Rights

An additional issue, lurking beneath the surface of the aforementioned issue, concerns the concept of human rights to be employed. Attention to the Western notion of fundamental rights is considered by
28
many to be an important ingredient of Hong Kong's current success.
The concept of rights employed in the PRC, and by the Nationalist government before 1949, has been described as a policy based notion of
rights.2 9 In contrast to the natural rights notion of Western liberalism,
the rights of the individual are more readily surrendered to the prevailing
policy or collective interest. The PRC Constitution speaks of the "rights
and duties"
of citizens, creating a somewhat contingent notion of
30
rights.
Whether the existing notion of rights will prevail in post-1997 Hong
Kong is difficult to determine. It is noteworthy that the title of chapter 3
of the current Basic Law draft is "Fundamental Rights and Duties of
HKSAR Inhabitants,1 3 1 which is in effect borrowing from the contingent
HKLR 231 (Privy Council); In re Application by the Attorney Gen., 1985 HKLR 381 (High
Court). As a practical matter, such potential for review of legislation rarely occurs, and Hong Kong
adheres to a tradition of legislative or parliamentary supremacy.
28 Reference here is to liberal notions of natural rights that could be considered part of the
English legal system employed in Hong Kong. See generally D. GERMINO, MACHIAVELLI TO
MARX, MODERN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 11648 (1972). Political discourse in Hong Kong
would suggest that such notion of rights is well established among Hong Kong's elite. A recent
survey among common people in an industrial community in Hong Kong would also tend to indicate very strong support for the Western concept of "freedom" generally, although no clear understanding of the idea of "inalienable rights." H. KUAN & S.KAU, COMMON LAW IN A CHINESE
SOCIETY: THE CASE OF HONG KONG (1987). I am not sure that common citizens in working class
communities in Western society have a clearer conception of the rights notion which they support.
Certainly, when considering Hong Kong's economic success, we should be more interested in how
important this rights notion is to the more elite or educated classes. The same survey indicated even
stronger support for the legal system and its rights base among the educated and economic elite.
29 See generally EDWARDS, supranote 25; 0. M. Fiss, Two Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L.
492 (1986).
30 See P.R.C. CONST. arts. 33-56 (ch. 2, The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens).
31 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, ch. 3.
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notion of rights in the PRC. Earlier drafts have also been criticized for
failing to secure adequately against future amendment the guarantees of
rights and freedoms "of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly,
of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, 3of2
choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief."
Such guarantees were listed as one of the twelve basic policies of the PRC
in the Joint Declaration3 3 but were omitted from a recent draft of the
general provisions of the Basic Law, along with several of the other enumerated basic policies from the Joint Declaration. Drafters have proposed as a solution a stipulation in the Basic Law that the basic policies
in the Joint Declaration cannot be amended while general provisions in
the Basic Law can.34 This of course still leaves us with interpretation
problems.
Draft proposals have also been criticized for failing to take rights
sufficiently seriously in other respects. A recent sub-group draft was criticized for suggesting that the onus for protecting inhabitants' rights and
freedoms lay with the legislature, as is true in the PRC. While such a
provision was rejected, draft language in the most recent draft does not
impose sufficient restraint on the legislature, employing language permitting restriction of rights "according to law." 3
The passage in Hong Kong of recent laws such as the Public Order
Ordinance, which makes it a crime to publish false news likely to cause
alarm to the public or disturb public order, has also raised post-1997
concern.3 6 Will there be equally restrained administration of such press
laws, or secrecy laws, or film censorship laws in the post-1997 period?
What will be the impact of the Basic Law in this respect? How might
application of the comparative method help us to understand the likely
impact of these various rights features on the future success of Hong
Kong?
E.

Other Issues

While the four previously discussed issues are the most contentious
and may well remain so after publication of the first draft of the Basic
Law in early 1988, other more solvable issues have occupied the drafters
in recent months. Some of these also offer fuel for comparative analysis.
CrucialClauses Omitted from Basic Law Draft, S. China Morning Post, Apr. 14, 1987.
Joint Declaration, supra note 7, para. 3.
34 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 169; Drafters Find Solution to Amendment Problem, S.
China Morning Post, June 6, 1987.
35 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 39; see also Group of 71 Plans Strategyfor Transfer, S.
China Morning Post, May 19, 1987; Basic Law Draft on Human Rights Has Many Failing,S. China
Morning Post, June 1, 1987 (quoting Mr. M.M. Chan, Lecturer in Law, Hong Kong University).
36 Onus on AG for Public OrderBill Prosecutions,S. China Morning Post, May 2, 1987; Review
of Press Bill By 1997, Says Tam, S. China Morning Post, May 4, 1987.
32
33
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These issues include: 1) the setting up and composition of a special Basic
Law Committee under the NPC to advise on interpretation and amendment of the Basic Law; 2) whether residuary or reserve power should be
vested in the national or the SAR government; 3) vesting of the power of
amendment of the Basic Law; and 4) application of PRC law in the SAR.
There appears to be general agreement, on the need for an advisory
Basic Law Committee but very little agreement on its composition and
function or whether it should be created by the Basic Law itself or directly by the NPC.37 Hong Kong drafters appear to favor that a majority of the members be from Hong Kong. The committee will likely have
several duties including some, as yet unspecified, role in the interpretation of the Basic Law. Since the committee will serve the NPC there is
also disagreement on whether the Basic Law should address the issue or
whether the drafters should merely recommend action to the NPC.
The question of residual powers gets hooked on Chinese claims that
China is not a federation and Hong Kong claims that vesting such power
in the SAR government is the only way to insure autonomy. 38 The potential for comparison with the reserved power (to the states) question in
the United States is obvious.
The Chinese drafters seem unanimously of the view that amendment
of the Basic Law should be left to the NPC, which ultimately must approve and enact the Basic Law. 39 The feeling is that the Basic Law is
PRC legislation and should be amended in accordance with the NPC
procedures. The Basic Law itself will only allow for initiation of proposals for amendment. The sub-group on local/central relations originally
took the view that the NPC Standing Committee and State Council
could propose changes but not the local legislature. Article 169 of the
Basic Law Draft provides that, in addition, a combination of two-thirds
of the local legislature, two-thirds of Hong Kong delegates to the NPC
and the chief executive could propose a change with each, in effect, having the ability to veto submission of such a proposal.
The question of application of China's socialist laws in the Hong
Kong SAR has likewise sparked contention but has now been allegedly
resolved. 4' Article 17 of the Basic Law Draft now specifies that applicable Chinese laws should be limited to those concerning defense, foreign
37 Rulemakers in Triple Move to Allay H.K. Fearson China Law, S. China Morning Post, June
7, 1987. Basic Law Draft, art. 168, for example, specifies that the NPC Standing Committee shall
consult the HKSAR Basic Law Committee when interpreting the Basic Law but specifies no further
the structure or procedures of such committee.
38 Power and Privileges,How the SAR Can Retain a CrucialRole, S. China Morning Post, Mar.
9, 1987.
39 lasic Law Won't Contain Provisionfor Amendment, S. China Morning Post, Mar. 15, 1987.
40 Basic Law Draft, supra note 4, art. 17; Agreement over China Law in HK, S. China Morning
Post, Aug. 5, 1987.
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affairs, and the realization of China's national unity which are outside
the scope of the high degree of autonomy given Hong Kong. In such
cases the State Council would direct the Hong Kong government to publish and implement the mainland laws that it determines should apply in
Hong Kong. Except in emergencies, the State Council should consult
the Hong Kong government and the Basic Law Committee before issuing
its directives. If the HKSAR does not comply with the directive, the
State Council may apply its directive by issuing an order. Some Hong
Kong drafters have objected to the possible direct application of PRC
law, viewing it as an affront to autonomy. In its statement on this point,
the Joint Declaration does not include PRC law among the laws that will
apply to the Hong Kong SAR. This may raise treaty obligation
problems.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC LAW-AN ILLUSTRATION OF

III.

THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH

So far this discussion has introduced a series of key issues that are
readily subject to comparative method used in comparative law or politics. A brief discussion of my experience in employing such methods
with respect to the implementation of the Basic Law serves an illustrative
purpose both for the comparative method and international legal exchange. It also reveals a possible structure for such application oriented
comparative analysis. Such comparative analysis may, in addition, improve our understanding of the substantive concept under examinationin this case constitutional judicial review-by subjecting it to more rigorous contextual and policy examination.
Taking account of the American tradition of constitutional judicial
review and considering various models employed elsewhere, I have preliminarily suggested a model for constitutional judicial review in Hong
Kong. This model embodies features from other common law jurisdictions, as well as features with roots in continental Europe, with all such
features being tailored to Hong Kong's unique circumstances and the
policy objectives of the Joint Declaration.4 1
A.

The Joint Declaration

An American constitutional scholar arriving on the scene of the intense Hong Kong Basic Law debate is struck by the uniqueness of the
Hong Kong context and the "one country, two systems" endeavor. With
reference to constitutional judicial review, the Joint Declaration proves
as ambiguous as international treaties can be. The current Basic Law
draft proposes that the interpretation power of the Basic Law belong pri41

Davis, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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manly to the Standing Committee of the NPC.4 2 This was described in
some press accounts as a power to review under the Basic Law and
"veto" all non-conforming SAR legislation.4 3 Under the draft provision
the SAR courts would retain some power of Basic Law interpretation,
but would be bound by previous interpretations of the NPC Standing
Committee. Suffice it to say that this proposal has met with considerable
opposition.
The sub-group that originally advanced the aforementioned proposal reportedly traces such allocation of power to a portion of Annex I,
section II of the Joint Declaration, which provides that the SAR legislature must report all legislation to the Standing Committee of the NPC
One should query whether such reporting for the
"for the record."'
record implies a power of review or veto. The draft provision gains further support from article 67 of the PRC Constitution which affords to
the Standing Committee the power to interpret legislation.4" Article 31
of the PRC Constitution, however, permits the creation of special systems in SARs and would therefore appear to permit delegation of the
power of interpretation, either in the Joint Declaration or Basic Law.46
While the Joint Declaration is slightly ambiguous on this point, a
case can be made that its language provides at least a strong suggestion of
constitutional judicial review and that such may be more consistent with
its spirit and the aspirations of the participants than constitutional review
power vested in the NPC Standing Committee. The basic policies of the
Joint Declaration and Annex I thereto are to be stipulated into the Basic
Law.4 7 The Joint Declaration indicates that these basic policies include
an "independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication"4 8
and requires that the rights enumerated therein "be ensured ... [or] be
protected by law."'4 9 Annex I, section II provides that laws previously in
force in Hong Kong, including the common law system, shall be maintained "save for any that contravene the Basic Law," 5 and that "[laws
42 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43 Agreement on Power of Veto, S. China Morning Post, Nov. 11, 1986. The mainland coconvenor of the subgroup on local/central relations, Mr. Shao Tienren, was quoted as saying, "the
NPC's Standing Committee will be vested with the final power to review future laws of Hong Kong,
but in practice, the NPC will be unlikely to exercise the power frequently." Id.
44 Joint Declaration, supra note 7, Annex I, § II.

45 P.R.C. CONST. art. 67.
46

The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to
be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the
National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions.
Id. art. 31.
47 Joint Declaration, supra note 7, para. 3(12).
48 Id. para. 3(3).
49 Id. para. 3(5).

50 Id. Annex I, § II.
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enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic Law
and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid."5 1 Should the courts
treat laws not so in accord as invalid? Annex I, section III requires
courts to act "independently and free from interference." 5 2 This would
tend to rule out judicial consultation with another entity such as the
NPC Standing Committee. Finally, Annex I, section XIII provides
"[e]very person shall have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts."5 3 Does this include the challenge of statutes or ordinances under which the executive purports to act? While it is not
conclusive, perhaps a much stronger case can be made for constitutional
judicial review than for NPC Standing Committee review where the Joint
Declaration rather clearly indicates that reporting of legislation to the
Standing Committee is "for the record." 5 4
B.

ParticipantPerspectives

With a clear resolution of this issue not available in the Joint Declaration, a more useful enterprise might be to examine what the Basic Law
can and should do on this issue. We might begin by examining the goals
of the participants in this unique political endeavor. Both the Hong
Kong and mainland participants share certain fundamental aspirations.
The rhetoric on both sides continuously emphasizes the importance of
maintaining political and economic stability in Hong Kong. This aspiration expressly includes maintaining a capitalist system,55 as well as establishing a certain degree of political democracy and maintaining certain
rights and liberties upon which this system is felt to depend. Political
autonomy and continuance of the common law system are also a part of
this package. There is general recognition that a certain dynamism of
Hong Kong derives from these various institutions and values.
While there is much common ground, these participants appear to
diverge in certain areas. Political discourse in Hong Kong has historically tended to view government as either a passive actor or as a
facilitator of private endeavors. This perception tends to carry with it a
Western Lockian conception of natural rights. It is the mission of government to uphold these rights upon which the system depends, and government will be called to task, often in the courts, if it fails to do so.56
51Id.
52
53

54
55
56

Clarke,
uscript,

Id. Annex I, § III.
Id. Annex I, § XIII.
Id. Annex I, § II.
Id. Annex I, § VI.
As a result, a rather extensive body of administrative law has developed. See generally D.
B. Lai & A. Luk, Hong Kong Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (unpublished manUniversity of Hong Kong, Dep't of Political Science, 1986).
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This conception may have some bearing on the historic confidence in
Hong Kong's economic and political institutions.
While Chinese mainland participants are equally committed to
Hong Kong's success, they may come to the drafting table with a fundamentally different conception of rights and the relationship of legal process to their implementation. A very different policy-based conception of
rights in China has recently been described by Professor Randle Edwards
and his colleagues.57 While in recent treaty accessions and in constitution drafting, China has begun to articulate a strong human rights commitment; this commitment may yet lack strong attention to the process
for implementation. This is not to criticize China's remarkable accomplishments but instead to point out a fundamental divergence in basic
values concerning rights and the rule of law between mainland China
and Hong Kong. Given an equal commitment to stability in Hong
Kong, constitutional judicial review may offer an avenue for meaningful
and stable value development without encouraging destabilizing political
disagreement as a result of such basic value differences.
C. A Theoretical and StructuralPerspective
An American constitutional scholar in this context might ask, as I
have elsewhere, how does constitutional judicial review offer a potential
avenue to stable and meaningful rights or value development in Hong
Kong? What does judicial review do? I examine these questions from
both a theoretical and structural perspective.
The debate over the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review has
raged for centuries, both in America, before and after the seminal decision of Marbury v. Madison, 8 and in England extending way back to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. It has raged in France in the ancient debate over separation of powers. With the spread of the institution of
constitutional judicial review throughout much of Europe, America and
Asia, this debate has spread as well. 9 How can judges be permitted to
thwart the will of the democratically elected branches of government? In
spite of this so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, this institution is increasingly employed by those countries serious about constitutional democracy and human rights, just as it is often rejected by those
governments not so inclined.' °
Some examination of this debate reveals how this institution func57 EDWARDS,

supra note 26, at 44, 125-64.

58 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
59 See generally H. Zamudio, A GlobalSurvey of GovernmentalInstitutions to Protect Civil and

PoliticalRights, 13 DEN J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 17 (1983).
60 See M. Capelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of JudicialReview and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 409, 439 (1980).
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tions successfully. Among the conclusions reached as a result of such
examination, I find views that constitutional judicial review merely involves a search for the original "intent" of the founding fathers to not
really reflect actual practice.6" As has been developed by Alexander
Bickel,62 constitutional review functions in America as a dialogue among
the judiciary, the elected branches of government and the people. This
dialogue, in the constitutional area is a process, largely written, aimed at
basic value development in the American system of government.
Whether it is through "passive virtues" or hitting issues head on by stops
and starts or even occasionally going forward and backing up a little, the
Court engages in a conversation with the other branches of government. 63 This conversation is aimed at basic value development in a constitutional democracy. Through this dialogue on the higher plane of
fundamental values, the Court contributes to a more stable basic value
development. It may depoliticize to a limited extent the task of basic
value development.
One need only watch the Basic Law drafting process in Hong Kong
and mainland China to realize that highly charged political discussions
about basic values can produce considerable anxiety and tend to generate
instability. Perhaps constitutional judicial review permits many basic
value issues to be addressed in a more ordered manner. In Hong Kong,
where the chance for basic value disagreement between a Marxist-Leninist state and a capitalist SAR is great, this ordering and stabilizing feature may be attractive.
On the structural side, Mauro Cappelletti has pointed out the seminal role of the American and Austrian models of judicial review.' I
have adopted his distinction between a decentralized incidenter and a
centralized principaliter system. 65 The former permits all courts (decentralized) to exercise review incidental to actual court cases while the latter concept suggest a centralized constitutional court which can decide
abstract constitutional questions as the principal issue and not merely
incidental to a case. This latter system, developed in Austria under the
influence of Hans Kelsen, originally permitted referral to the constitutional court only from the political branches, but all such systems now
permit a form of incidenter review on referral from other courts as well.
Use of such a centralized principaliter system in continental Europe was
61 For discussion of original intent doctrine, see generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
62 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
63 See id. at 70, 111 passim. See also H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE
L.J. 486 (1982).
64 M. CAPALLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 45 passim (1971).

65 Id. at 45-84.
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especially influenced by functional notions of separation of powers and
the belief that ordinary courts should not exercise such political power.
Such constitutional courts were originally attentive to issues concerning
delineation of functional separation of powers. Continental judges are
likewise more given to a tradition of abstract principle development.
In examining these two traditions one might notice that the continental model is more useful for abstract policing of the lines of power, as
indeed was its original design. The common law or American model
seems more conducive to an incremental, dialogue-based value development. Avoidance technics are more readily available in the common law
or American model than in the continental model where the role of the
constitutional court may be more confined.
D. A Model for Hong Kong
Confronted with the stark contrast between constitutional values in
Hong Kong and mainland China and being particularly interested in
legal process, I have considered the very real difficulty inherent in any
attempt to implement the notion of "one country, two systems," to be
embodied in the Basic Law. This leads me to suggest a model that takes
account of the various aspirations and factors noted above, as follows:
My initial feeling is that Hong Kong might best benefit from use
of a bifurcated system. At the local level this would include a decentralized incidenter system of constitutional judicial review similar to
the one employed in most common law jurisdictions (all common law
jurisdictions with written constitutions or basic laws). This would permit local judiciary at all levels, bound by highest court precedent, to
review the acts of the legislative branch, as well as the executive, for
conformity to both the powers and rights components of the Basic
Law. This should generally include the full extent of the Basic Law.
Yet, being part of a national system based initially on civil law traditions, certain components of a centralized principaliter system could be
used to resolve constitutional issues involving constitutional power or
jurisdiction questions between the central and local government or
questions involving the Constitution of the PRC. This latter feature
would preserve national authority in areas of national concern; yet, it
is anticipated that it would rarely be employed because of its limited
field of coverage and the ability to resolve most such issues in the Basic
Law itself. A special committee composed of an equal number of
Hong Kong and Mainland compatriots could be set up under the NPC
or independent of it. To satisfy any question under article 67 of the
PRC Constitution, the Basic Law could expressly delegate such power
to the local courts and the special committee as indicated. To preserve
autonomy and the independence and finality of local courts, I would
permit referral of constitutional issues to the special committee only by
the SAR executive or two-thirds of the legislature and by an appropri-
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ate organ of the central government. Local courts would not make
such referral exercising their constitutional judicial review independently. Local courts would ultimately be held in check by the amendment power, though it is anticipated that such courts would likely
proceed rather conservatively6 6in their constitutional mission as is often
true of common law courts.
I have also offered a ten point argument in favor of this model, as

follows:
1. The current British approach to rights development under a
system of parliamentary supremacy may not be realistic outside of the
British cultural and political context.
2. Constitutional judicial review seems more appropriate to a
written constitution and is generally so employed in most common law
jurisdictions.
3. Pure reliance on mainland-style legislative implementation
seems unlikely to achieve a rights commitment that would be trusted
and would thus cause considerable local tension and instability, not to
mention offense to the notion of autonomy and "one country, two
systems."
4. Current discussions in the Basic Law Consultative Committee
suggest general agreement on employing separation of powers with
checks and balances, as opposed to the civil law separation of functions
approach, suggesting the appropriateness of a more common law
approach.
5. Yet, as is true of the function of the French constitutional
court, a special committee employing a centralized principaliter system
may function well for the limited purpose of functional separation of
powers between the two governments as well as providing an expression of national authority.
6. The existing use of common law and stare decisis in Hong
Kong likewise favors the decentralized incidenter system as does the
training of local lawyers and the judiciary.
7. Decentralized judicial review with access to avoidance technics or passive virtues may better take advantage of the dialogue based
evolution of principles in general in common law systems and of rights
in particular.
8. Decentralized incidenter judicial review offers more avenues
for evolutionary change in fundamental values with less risk of serious
confrontation, thus advancing political stability and human rights.
9. The existing legal system contains the ingredients for such a
66 Davis, supra note 2. In my view, the constitutional committee should rarely, if ever, be used.
It would stand more as a symbol of national authority or be available in the event of a constitutional
crisis. Otherwise, the Basic Law and any revisions of article 31 of the PRC Constitution could
resolve most potential issues within the limited scope of the committee's power. It is very unlikely
that the extremely conservative Hong Kong courts would get too far ahead of the local polity.
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system and would thus permit continuity and permit Hong Kong to
employ other common law precedent.
10. Hong Kong and China would thus be able to participate in a
growing international commitment to employing proper process in the
implementation of human rights. 67

For an American constitutional scholar, there is a certain familiarity
in the Joint Declaration. The Joint Declaration reveals a prominent
commitment to autonomy, self determination, stability, capitalist economy, and human rights in a common law framework. These concepts
collectively provide the outline of a pluralist, liberal capitalist system.
Constitutional judicial review appears to embody recognition of and a
commitment to the basic values of a society. Its almost geometrical
growth in use around the world reveals a growing belief that constitutional judicial review offers an opportunity to give life to the constitutional framework in a stable way essential to a functioning democracy.
Yet any use of this instrument should be sensitive to the peculiar strains
of the Hong Kong experiment.
This concept of the judiciary and constitutional review, as one side
of a dialogue designed to articulate basic values, is a concept that depends on the other participants in this conversation. With the strong
influence of China to the north, it seems that a political system in Hong
Kong that fails to engage the local people will fail to insure liberty or
autonomy. The people, not the courts alone, are the guardians of liberty.
Until now, a British political process has offered a degree of protection to
Hong Kong, but that will not be the case in the future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While it is difficult to measure scholarly contribution, it seems apparent that an American constitutional scholar in Hong Kong at the
present time has plentiful opportunities. Hong Kong affords both an educational opportunity and a chance to participate in a unique developmental process of constitutionalism. For example, I have found that the
characteristics of the converging legal systems involved tend to result in
the Hong Kong and Chinese legal community overlooking some aspects
of the very complex process issues involved in implementing a Basic Law
in a capitalist SAR in Marxist-Leninist China. Very little Hong Kong or
Chinese scholarship addresses the notion of constitutional judicial review
in the Hong Kong SAR context.
Comparative law scholarship has often been preoccupied with mere
67 Id. The comparative reference to the French constitutional court here is to its mission.
Whether it is or is not a court in the true sense is not the object of comparison. See generally Davis,
The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel,and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34
AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1986).
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description. This means that those parts of the world infected with upheaval and constant change are neglected. No one wants to describe a
moving target; yet, these areas are precisely where close contextual examination of comparative constitutional law fundamentals can do the most
good-with an eye more to application than description. The constitutional road map of Asia is, for example, now being redrafted at a rapid
pace. This redrafting often involves a struggle with Western constitutional values. Western comparative constitutional scholarship can contribute to this process. Local drafters, in the struggle of political debate,
sometimes overlook fundamentals that a comparative reflection may
catch.
In the context of adopting foreign constitutional concepts, an analytical framework for application oriented comparative legal scholarship
might at least include the following components:
1. The stated objectives;
2. The perspectives of the participants/language(a) local values/culture and
(b) theoretical and structural Western concepts sought to be
accommodated;
3. Development of a proposed model; and
4. Critical examination of the model.
This framework offers simplicity, openness, and comprehensiveness. Of
course, thoroughness also demands a critical examination of the analytical framework employed. This latter task aims at reflective development
of the tools of comparative legal scholarship. This Article only begins to
offer the beginning self-conscious reflections of a comparative constitutional legal scholar placed in a rather rigorous foreign constitution drafting context. An in-depth analysis of the factors that impact the
application of imported constitutional concepts is a task awaiting comparative legal scholars.

